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This criticism, however, is more properly addressed to the legis-
lature than the courts. It is submitted that CPLR 215(3) should be
amended to include abuse of process among the intentional torts
subject to a one-year statute of limitations. Until such an amend-
ment is forthcoming, however, the Levine court's application of a
three-year period is the proper result.
ARTICLE 3-JURISDICTION AND SERVICE, APPEARANCE AND CHOICE OF
COURT
CPLR 303: Counterclaim by Seider-predicated third-party Dole
defendant does not constitute commencement of an action.
CPLR 303 provides that the commencement of an action in
New York by a person not otherwise amenable to personal jurisdic-
tion exposes the plaintiff to full in personam jurisdiction in any
action brought by a party to the original action which "would have
been permitted as a counterclaim had the action been brought in
the supreme court." 3 Thus, a nonresident who commences an ac-
tion in New York assumes the risk that a party to the action may
assert a claim against him, for which, pursuant to CPLR 303, he is
subject to full in personam jurisdiction. 4 Recently, in Green v.
Bender,5 5 the Supreme Court, Westchester County, was confronted
with the novel question whether a Seider-predicated " third-party
53 CPLR 303.
" See 1 WK&M 303.01.
55 175 N.Y.L.J. 115, June 15, 1976, at 11, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County).
" In Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966), the Court
of Appeals held that a nondomiciliary may be brought within the jurisdiction of the New York
courts by attachment of his automobile liability insurance policy if his insurer is present in
this state. The Court reasoned that because the insurer had an obligation to the insured to
defend and indemnify him to the extent of the insurance policy limits, a "debt" existed which
was subject to attachment. The Seider decision was reconsidered and reaffirmed in Simpson
v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967), wherein the Court
declared that a Seider-predicated defendant is entitled to make a limited appearance
whereby his liability cannot exceed the limits of his insurance policy. Id. at 310, 234 N.E.2d
at 671, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 636-37. See also Bertucci v. Red Top Sedan Serv., Inc., 48 App. Div.
2d 677, 368 N.Y.S.2d 236 (2d Dep't 1975) (mem.); Seligman v. Tucker, 46 App. Div. 2d 402,
362 N.Y.S.2d 881 (4th Dep't), motion for leave to appeal dismissed, 36 N.Y.2d 921, 335
N.E.2d 844, 373 N.Y.S.2d 536 (1975) (mem.); Tjepkema v. Kenney, 31 App. Div. 2d 908, 298
N.Y.S.2d 175 (1st Dep't) (mem.), motion for leave to appeal dismissed, 24 N.Y.2d 740, 250
N.E.2d 68, 302 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1969). The right to a limited appearance has been codified in
CPLR 320(c)(1), which provides for a limited appearance where quasi-in-rem jurisdiction has
been obtained over a defendant by virtue of attachment of his property within the state. As
supplemented by Simpson, Seider has withstood constitutional attack in the federal courts.
See Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), aff'd en banc, 410 F.2d 117 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969). For an analysis of the constitutional issues presented
in Seider, see Note, Seider v. Roth: The Constitutional Phase, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 58 (1968).
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defendant who counterclaims against the third-party plaintiff for
Dole 7 apportionment commences an action which results in his sub-
mission to in personam jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 303. In re-
solving this question, the Green court held that the assertion of a
Dole apportionment claim by any procedural device against a party
in a pending action does not result in the claimant's exposure to in
personam jurisdiction under CPLR 303.15
In Green, plaintiff, a New York resident, was injured in New
Hampshire when the automobile in which he was riding collided
with a double-parked truck. Plaintiff commenced a personal injury
action against the operator of the automobile, Bender, who im-
pleaded Harlowe, the nonresident owner of the truck, for Dole ap-
portionment. As a predicate for jurisdiction, Bender served an order
of attachment upon Harlowe's casualty insurer. In response, Har-
lowe served an answer containing general denials and a counter-
claim against Bender for Dole apportionment. Subsequently, plain-
tiff attempted to bring Harlowe into the action as a prime defen-
dant, contending that the interposition of the counterclaim by
Harlowe constituted the commencement of an action within the
meaning of CPLR 303 and thus subjected Harlowe to service of
process upon his counsel."0 Harlowe, however, argued that a claim
for Dole apportionment is a defensive maneuver rather than the
commencement of an action within the ambit of CPLR 303, and
therefore should not expose a Seider-predicated defendant to in
9 In Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972),
the Court adopted the theory of equitable apportionment of fault among joint tortfeasors. It
ruled that a claim for apportionment may be asserted by either a third-party action or a
separate proceeding. Id. at 149, 282 N.E.2d at 292, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 387. In Kelly v. Long
Island Lighting Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25, 286 N.E.2d 241, 334 N.Y.S.2d 851 (1972), wherein defen-
dante crossclaimed for Dole apportionment, the Court ruled that the degree of responsibility
of each tortfeasor should be determined at trial. Consequently, claims for Dole apportionment
have taken many forms. See, e.g., Katz v. Dykes, 41 App. Div. 2d 913, 343 N.Y.S.2d 399 (1st
Dep't 1973) (mem.) (counterclaim); Wallace v. Weiss, 82 Misc. 2d 1053, 372 N.Y.S.2d 416
(Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1975) (cross-claim); Szarewicz v. Alboro Crane Rental Corp., 73
Misc. 2d 232, 341 N.Y.S.2d 153 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1973) (third-party action). Dole
apportionment is now codified in CPLR 1403, which provides: "A cause of action for contribu-
tion may be asserted in a separate action or by cross-claim, counterclaim or third-party claim
in a pending action."
175 N.Y.L.J. 115 at 12, col. 2.
Id. at 11, cols. 5-6. In the alternative, plaintiff sought an order of attachment against
Harlowe's insurance policy. Id., col. 6. The court summarily granted this motion. See id. at
12, col. 3.
61 Id. at 11, col. 6. A counterclaim is a cause of action, CPLR 3019(a), and thus lies within
the ambit of CPLR 303. Pursuant to a strict interpretation of this provision, it can be argued
that a Seider-predicated defendant who counterclaims may lose his jurisdictional defenses.
See note 70 infra.
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personam jurisdiction.'
In arriving at his decision, Justice Gagliardi noted that CPLR
303 is designed to permit service of process upon local counsel repre-
senting a nonresident who has commenced an action in New York.
It was the opinion of Justice Gagliardi that Harlowe's Dole counter-
claim fell within the literal scope of this provision. 2 Nevertheless,
the court declined to hold that interposition of a Dole counterclaim
exposed Harlowe to in personam liability. This conclusion was
based essentially upon New York's refusal to strictly apply the
"ancient" doctrine that a nonresident defendant who seeks
affirmative relief in the forum waives all his jurisdictional defen-
ses.63 Since the liberalization of this doctrine, New York courts have
held that the assertion of a counterclaim, at least one related to the
complaint, by a nonresident defendant does not result in a waiver
of jurisdictional defenses. 4 Also in line with this approach is CPLR
320(c)(1), which permits a nonresident defendant, in a case where
jurisdiction has been obtained only by the attachment of property
within the state, to contest on the merits without subjecting himself
to in personam jurisdiction. 5
Since a Dole counterclaim for apportionment is related to the
.subject matter of the complaint, the Green court concluded that its
interposition should not be viewed as the commencement of an
action within the meaning of CPLR 303.66 Thus, the Green court
S, 175 N.Y.L.J. 115 at 11, col. 6.
" Id. at 12, col. 2.
3 Id., col. 1; see CPLR 3211(e); CPLR 3211, commentary at 63-64 (McKinney 1970); id.
at 18-19 (McKinney Supp. 1976).
64 175 N.Y.L.J. 115 at 12, col. 1. See, e.g., Goodman v. Solow, 27 App. Div. 2d 920, 279
N.Y.S.2d 377 (1st Dep't) (mem.), leave to appeal denied, 20 N.Y.2d 646, 231 N.E.2d 789, 285
N.Y.S.2d 1026 (1967); M. Katz & Son Billiard Prods., Inc. v. G. Correale & Sons, Inc., 26
App. Div. 2d 52, 270 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1st Dep't 1966), aff'd, 20 N.Y.2d 903, 232 N.E.2d 864,
285 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1967) (mem.).
See CPLR 320, commentary at 373 (McKinney 1972).
W6 here a counterclaim is the outgrowth of the primary action, courts have held that in
the interest of judicial economy, assertion of such a counterclaim should not result in a loss
of jurisdictional defenses. See, e.g., Italian Colony Restaurant, Inc. v. Wershals, 45 App. Div.
2d 841, 358 N.Y.S.2d 448 (2d Dep't 1974) (mem.). See also CPLR 320, commentary at 379
(McKinney 1972), wherein Professor McLaughlin draws a similar distinction between those
claims which are related to the plaintiffs complaint and those based on events independent
of the matters in the complaint. Where a defendant institutes a cross-claim or counterclaim
unrelated to the plaintiffs cause of action, he is really introducing what could, and indeed,
should, be a separate lawsuit. Professor McLaughlin thus concludes:
Since it is no more convenient for the court to try that claim in the plaintiffs
litigation than to try it in an independent lawsuit, . . . judicial efficiency is not
particularly enhanced by this procedure, and, therefore, if the defendant desires to
take this tack, he should be forced to surrender his limited appearance and to
submit to full in personam jurisdiction.
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held that the "injection" of Dole apportionment by any procedural
device against a party in a pending action does not expose the claim-
ant to in personam jurisdiction.6 7
Prior to Green, it was generally accepted that a claim for Dole
apportionment merely constitutes a defense-an attempt by the
defendant to avoid being held liable for the full amount of plaintiff's
claim. 8 In fact, it was stated that a Dole claim has no existence
independent of the primary claim asserted by the plaintiff.9 Conse-
quently, the Green court appears to have been on sound footing in
characterizing Harlowe's Dole counterclaim as a defense rather than
an attempt to seek affirmative relief.70
It is submitted, however, that the Green court neglected to
examine fully the applicability of CPLR 303 to the case at bar.
Although the statute does not expressly so provide, it seems appar-
ent that it was intended to be utilized only by a defendant. 71 The
terms of the statute require that the action in which in personam
Id. But if the defendant is asserting a claim which arises out of the identical action, and is
really defending his interest, "only the gravest considerations" should cause the defendant's
limited appearance to ripen into full jurisdiction. The defendant should be encouraged to
interpose his counterclaim, rather than to wait for a determination of plaintiff's claim and
then bring a separate action. Id. at 379-80.
87 175 N.Y.L.J. 115 at 12, col. 2.
See, e.g., Tarantola v. Williams, 48 App. Div. 2d 552, 555, 371 N.Y.S.2d 136, 140 (2d
Dep't 1975).
11 Id. The Tarantola court, in interpreting the effect of a general release on the right to
Dole apportionment, stated that such a claim "is more in the nature of a defense ... than
an affirmative claim .... Id. at 554, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 140. Consequently, the general release
did not result in loss of the right to indemnification or apportionment of liability. Accord,
Slater v. American Mineral Spirits Co., 33 N.Y.2d 443, 449, 310 N.E.2d 300, 303, 354
N.Y.S.2d 620, 625 (1974) (Jasen, J., dissenting).
70 But see Brooks v. Birmes, 169 N.Y.L.J. 14, Jan. 19, 1973, at 17, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County). In Brooks, a Seider-predicated defendant sought to counterclaim for Dole appor-
tionment against the plaintiff. In granting the defendant's motion to amend his answer to
allow interposition of the claim, the court warned that the defendant was subjecting himself
to in personam liability.
In discussing Brooks, Justice Gagliardi distinguished the factual situation present in
Green. In Brooks, he explained, "apportionment was not in the case prior to the motion for
leave to amend, the claim was directed against the plaintiff and CPLR 303 was not consid-
ered." 175 N.Y.L.J. 115 at 12, col. 2. In accord with Brooks, however, is Ausubel, The Impact
of New York's Judicially Created Loss Apportionment Amongst Tortfeasors, 38 ALB. L. REV.
155, 168-69 (1974), wherein the author agrees that when a defendant interposes a counter-
claim, cross-claim or third-party complaint, even for Dole apportionment, he seeks
affirmative relief, and is not merely asserting a defense to plaintiff's claim.
11 CPLR 303 is based on CPA 227-a, which was specifically limited to defendants. CPLR
303, commentary at 156 (McKinney 1972). "It applies to a 'separate action brought against
the plaintiff by the defendant in an action first brought against him by the plaintiff.'" 37
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 285, 306 (1963), quoting PRASHKER, NEW YoRK PRAcrIC § 99A, at 232 (4th
ed. 1959) (discussing CPA 227-a).
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jurisdiction is sought be one which could have been brought as a
counterclaim in the original action had the original action been
brought in the supreme court. Since only a defendant can counter-
claim,7 2 it is logical to conclude that CPLR 303 should be available
only to a defendant.7 3
In Green, the party seeking to take advantage of CPLR 303 was
the plaintiff in the primary action. Harlowe's counterclaim was as-
serted not against him, but rather against Bender; hence, the pri-
mary plaintiff should not be considered a defendant within the con-
text of CPLR 303. Moreover, since a Dole claim has generally been
considered a defense rather than the commencement of an action,
it would seem that even Bender could not have utilized CPLR 303
to secure in personam jurisdiction over Harlowe.74
Finally, it should also be noted that the counterclaim inter-
posed by Harlowe was superfluous. Bender had already introduced
the apportionment issue by impleading Harlowe, and the latter's
counterclaim added nothing to the action. In all probability, Har-
lowe, who could not actually benefit by the interposition of a Dole
counterclaim, did so in conformity with his insurer's pro forma prac-
tice.7 5
In conclusion, while it is clear that Justice Gagliardi reached
the correct result in Green, it is submitted that the court's inquiry
into CPLR 303 should have revealed that, by its terms, this statute
was intended to be utilized not by a plaintiff in the primary action,
but instead, only by a defendant.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW
Court of Appeals reaffirms vitality of Donovan-Arthur rule.
Stemming from a long line of New York decisions, the
Donovan-Arthur rule requires suppression of any statements elic-
ited from a criminal defendant in the absence of his retained or
assigned counsel unless the defendant has first waived his rights in
the presence of his attorney.76 Although it was originally held to be
72 See CPLR 3019(a).
13 See CPLR 303, commentary at 156-57 (McKinney 1972).
11 See notes 66-70 and accompanying text supra.
75 Indeed, had the court ruled in favor of Green and held that Harlowe waived his
jurisdictional defenses by counterclaiming, it is quite possible that Harlowe would have had
a claim against his insurer "for its counsel's zealousness in exposing the insured to personal
liability." 175 N.Y.L.J. 115 at 12, col. 3 (footnote omitted).
78 The Donovan-Arthur rule was developed in a line of cases that predated the Supreme
Court decisions in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
[Vol. 51:201
